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Three studies are reported showing that emotional responses to stress can be modified by systematic prior
practice in adopting particular processing modes. Participants were induced to think about positive and
negative scenarios in a mode either characteristic of or inconsistent with the abstract-evaluative mind-set
observed in depressive rumination, via explicit instructions (Experiments 1 and 2) and via implicit
induction of interpretative biases (Experiment 3), before being exposed to a failure experience. In all
three studies, participants trained into the mode antithetical to depressive rumination demonstrated less
emotional reactivity following failure than participants trained into the mode consistent with depressive
rumination. These findings provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that processing mode
modifies emotional reactivity and support the processing-mode theory of rumination.
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Depressive rumination, defined as “behavior and thoughts that
focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the
implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569)
has been identified as a core process in the onset and maintenance
of depression. Prospective longitudinal studies have found that
self-reported depressive rumination predicts the likelihood, sever-
ity, and duration of syndromal depression (Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000; Spasojevic ´ & Alloy, 2001).
One potential mechanism by which depressive rumination may
contribute to the onset and maintenance of depression is via
influencing emotional reactivity. Emotional reactivity is concep-
tualized as the change in the quality and intensity of affect in
response to an emotionally evocative event, such as change in
despondency following a failure (e.g., Rottenberg, Gross, Wil-
helm, & Gotlib, 2001; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford,
2006). Experimental studies have found that induction of depres-
sive rumination intensifies dysphoric mood, increases negative
thinking, and impairs problem solving relative to distraction in
individuals already in a dysphoric mood, but has no differential
effect in individuals who are not already dysphoric (e.g.,
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1993). These findings suggest that, when there is a
negative emotional response to a stressful event, depressive rumi-
nation will further exacerbate negative affect and negative think-
ing, whereas when there is little or no negative emotional response,
rumination will have no further impact. Thus, it is hypothesized
that when confronted with a stressful event, depressive rumination
will further exacerbate any negative emotional response produced
by the stressor. Consistent with this, increased trait rumination is
associated with increased emotional reactivity (Thomsen, Jør-
gensen, Mehlsen, & Zachariae, 2004).
Recent evidence has suggested that there are a number of
distinct modes of rumination, each of which has distinct functional
properties, some adaptive and others maladaptive, such that the
consequences of rumination may, in part, be determined by the
processing mode that is active during rumination (Watkins, 2008).
Phenomenologically, depressive rumination is characterized by a
multidimensional configuration of focus on self and symptoms,
self-evaluation, repeated analysis of the causes, meanings, conse-
quences, and implications of symptoms of depression, negative
social comparisons, and “Why?” type questions (Roberts, Gilboa,
& Gotlib, 1998; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).
Moreover, this processing configuration is implicated in the
detrimental effects of rumination. In studies of patients with major
depression, Watkins and colleagues have compared two variants of
the standard rumination manipulation. These constitute (a) an
abstract, verbal–analytical, evaluative variant, consistent with the
phenomenology of depressive rumination, in which participants
are instructed to “think about the causes, meanings, and conse-
quences” of their symptoms and feelings, and (b) a concrete,
experiential variant, inconsistent with the phenomenology of de-
pressive rumination, in which participants are instructed to “focus
attention on the experience of” their symptoms and feelings. Com-
pared to the abstract, evaluative variant, the concrete, experiential
variant reduced overgeneral autobiographical memory recall (E.
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004), reduced negative global self-
evaluations (Rimes & Watkins, 2005), and improved social prob-
lem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005), indicating that processing
mode influences the consequences of rumination.
These results prompted the development of the processing-mode
theory of rumination, which proposes that the negative cognitive
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reactivity, are, in part, determined by the processing configuration
adopted during focus on self, feelings, and problems, with the
mode consistent with depressive rumination having maladaptive
consequences, and modes antithetical to this configuration having
adaptive consequences (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins,
2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Thus, the processing-mode the-
ory hypothesizes that processing mode will influence variation in
emotional reactivity. To test this prediction directly, it is necessary
to manipulate the processing mode active during the stressful event
experimentally, in order to assess consequent changes in emotional
response. Inducing a processing mode consistent with the process-
ing configuration found in depressive rumination (henceforth “de-
pressive rumination mode” or “DR mode”) is relatively straight-
forward: There is general consensus that this mode is characterized
by abstract, evaluative, and analytical processing. In order to
induce a processing mode inconsistent with the processing config-
uration found in depressive rumination (henceforth “mode anti-
thetical to depressive rumination” or “A-DR mode”), the manip-
ulation needs to produce a mode of processing that is
phenomenologically different from the processing configuration
found in depressive rumination, and, in particular, differs on those
dimensions that are the active elements influencing the conse-
quences of ruminative self-focus.
One relevant dimension within the processing-mode theory is
the relative degree of abstract construal versus low-level, concrete
construal (Watkins, in press). Research on mental representation in
the cognitive and social–cognitive literatures makes a distinction
between higher- and lower-level construals (Trope, 1989; Trope &
Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). High-level constru-
als are abstract, general, superordinate, and decontextualized men-
tal representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of
events and actions (e.g., inferences of global traits that are invari-
ant across different situations, such as “laziness,” or representa-
tions of “why” an action is performed and of its ends and conse-
quences). In contrast, low-level construals are more concrete
mental representations that include subordinate, contextual, and
incidental details of events and actions (e.g., inferences of
situation-specific states, such as “tiredness,” or representations of
the specific “how” details of an action and of the means to an end).
Within this construal-level analysis, the processing configuration
or “mind-set” characteristic of depressive rumination involves
predominantly high-level construals about self and mood: Rumi-
native thinking is focused on meanings, consequences, implica-
tions, and “why” questions, and is characterized by reduced con-
creteness of thinking (Sto ¨ber & Borkovec, 2002; Watkins &
Moulds, 2005, 2007). Furthermore, those experimental manipula-
tions that demonstrate antithetical effects to depressive rumination,
such as reducing overgeneral memory and improving problem
solving, despite involving equivalent focus on self and feelings,
are characterized by low-level construals, such as focus on direct,
concrete experience and more specific, detailed representations of
the self and of problems (Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins &
Molds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).
Moreover, there are reasons to suppose that level of construal
could directly account for variations in emotional reactivity.
Whereas low-level construals involve contextualized representa-
tions, high-level construals engender generalizations. Thus, in the
context of a negative event, relative to low-level construals, high-
level construals are likely to produce negative overgeneralizations
(e.g., “I am always making mistakes”), such that a single failure is
generalized to a global sense of personal inadequacy (Carver &
Ganellen, 1983; Rimes & Watkins, 2005). Such generalization is
known to increase risk for depression (Carver, 1998) and exacer-
bate emotional reactivity (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Moreover,
voluntarily recalling an emotional event in specific detail produces
less emotional response than recalling it at a more general level
(Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006; Philippot, Schaefer, &
Herbette, 2003), and practicing recalling specific autobiographical
memories reduces the negative experience to a subsequent stress-
ful task relative to prior practice at recalling general autobiograph-
ical memories (Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006). Thus,
by influencing the extent of generalization, processing character-
ized by high-level construals is hypothesized to exacerbate emo-
tional reactivity relative to processing characterized by low-level
construals.
The processing-mode theory therefore predicts that adopting a
processing mode characterized by high-level construals, consistent
with depressive rumination (DR mode), will increase subsequent
emotional reactivity, compared to adopting a processing mode
characterized by low-level construals, inconsistent with depressive
rumination (A-DR mode). In order to test this prediction, the
current studies were designed to induce a mind-set either consis-
tent with or inconsistent with the processing configuration found in
depressive rumination (i.e., abstract, evaluative, analytical), rather
than to induce a state directly analogous to depressive rumination
itself. In this way, the studies only tested the role of one particular
element of rumination—the processing mode adopted—in influ-
encing emotional reactivity.
In a preliminary study using this approach, participants repeat-
edly focused on both positive and negative scenarios in either a
low-level, concrete construal mode (“imagine the details of what is
happening in each scenario”) or a high-level, abstract construal
mode (“think about the causes, meanings, and implications of each
situation”), before a failure experience (Moberly & Watkins,
2006). After the failure experience, higher levels of trait rumina-
tion were associated with lower levels of positive affect, but only
for participants in the high-level, abstract construal condition and
not for participants in the low-level, concrete construal condition.
Thus, processing mode moderated the effect of trait rumination on
emotional reactivity following a failure. However, this study was
limited in only utilizing a student sample tested in a group practical
class and in only using positive affect as the measure of mood. To
confirm relevance to depression, replication of the finding is
needed with a depression-related measure (e.g., despondency).
Moreover, the processing-mode theory predicts that mode alone
can causally influence emotional reactivity; therefore a direct
demonstration of a main effect of processing mode on emotional
reactivity, coupled with the findings of Moberly and Watkins
(2006), would provide convergent evidence consistent with the
processing-mode theory.
To that end, this article reports three experiments that investi-
gate the hypothesis that processing mode can causally influence
subsequent emotional reactivity. Experiment 1 examines whether
an extensive training procedure delivered in an individual format
produces a main effect of processing mode on subsequent emo-
tional reactivity. Experiment 2 examines whether the effects of
Experiment 1 can be replicated and adds a no-training control
365 PROCESSING MODE AND EMOTIONAL REACTIVITYcondition in order to explore whether the effect of manipulating
processing mode on emotional reactivity is due to a maladaptive
effect of DR mode or due to a beneficial effect of A-DR mode.
Experiment 3 further tests the hypothesis that level of construal is
an active element within the different processing modes, by uti-
lizing a different methodology (implicit training of interpretative
bias) that is nevertheless conceptually consistent with the induc-
tion of high-level versus low-level construals. In each experiment,
participants worked through a set of emotional scenarios in a
manner designed to train them to adopt either DR mode or A-DR
mode. Following these training protocols, participants were ex-
posed to an anagram stress failure manipulation designed to induce
negative mood. Variations in emotional reactivity were revealed
by variations in the degree to which the stress task altered self-
reported mood (Wilson et al., 2006).
In summary, the aim of these studies was to test whether
processing mode plays a causal role in influencing emotional
reactivity and, more specifically, whether shifting processing away
from a mind-set characteristic of depressive rumination reduces
emotional reactivity. Across all three experiments, we hypothe-
sized that those participants trained into A-DR mode should show
attenuated emotional reactivity, relative to those participants
trained into DR mode. We expected that training itself would not
directly affect mood because the processing-mode theory predicts
that the different modes change the way information is processed
rather than the content and valence of what is processed. Further-
more, the training conditions matched positive and negative sce-
narios, so there should be no overall mood-induction effect or
valence effect across the different training conditions. Moreover,
previous studies have failed to find any direct mood-induction
effect of manipulating processing mode (Moberly & Watkins,
2006; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Likewise, we expected
that there would be no difference in the magnitude of self-focus
induced across the training conditions as the training conditions
were balanced for extent of self-reference.
Experiment 1
Method
Overview
This experiment consisted of a processing-mode induction train-
ing phase, followed by a failure stress phase. During the training
phase, all participants read through 30 short descriptions of posi-
tive and negative situations while imagining each event happening
to them. Each participant was allocated at random to instructions
designed to induce either high-level construals consistent with
depressive rumination or low-level construals inconsistent with
depressive rumination, when processing each situation. After this
training phase, participants attempted one item from a social
problem-solving task, which was then rated as a manipulation
check of the induction of the intended mode. Following this
training phase, all participants then completed an anagram stressor
task designed to induce the experience of failure and despondent
mood.
Participants
Forty participants were recruited from a panel of community
and student volunteers (age, M  25.93, SD  5.91; 10 male,
30 female; 25% students, 75% community volunteers). All partic-
ipants were paid £10 ($20) on completion of the experiment. No
participants met diagnostic criteria for current or past major de-
pression on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV (SCID;
Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1996) and all scored less than
12 on the Beck Depression Inventory–II (BDI) (M  1.77, SD 
1.58; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The participants were ran-
domly allocated to one of two training conditions designed to
induce DR mode and A-DR mode, respectively. There were no
differences between participants in the two conditions on any of
the baseline measures (age, BDI, initial despondency), all Fs  1.
A chi-squared analysis revealed that there was no difference in
allocation of gender across the conditions, p  .71.
Materials
Level-of-construal training conditions. Fifteen positive and 15
negative written scenarios, each approximately three sentences in
length, were used as the training material for all participants. For
example, one negative scenario read as follows:
You have an argument with your best friend. You have only had a few
minor disagreements in the past, but this argument becomes heated
and she tells you that she feels that she will never be able to trust you
again. You are shocked and hurt.
For example, one positive scenario read as follows:
You go for a job interview. You are well prepared and able to answer
the questions competently. The interview panel is friendly and en-
couraging, and you leave feeling very confident that you had per-
formed well enough to secure the position.
All participants read through all 30 scenarios, with instructions
to spend a minute concentrating on each event. The order of the
written scenarios was randomized with the constraint that there
were no more than three scenarios of the same valence presented
consecutively. Both positive and negative scenarios were used for
the training conditions to ensure the training conditions were not
direct mood inductions. Rather, the training conditions were de-
signed to ensure that the intended processing configuration was
trained to both positive and negative scenarios.
To prepare the training materials, we generated 34 scenarios that
reflected positive and negative events across a range of settings
(social, interpersonal, academic, employment) relevant to our par-
ticipant sample. Ten independent judges rated each scenario on
1–7 Likert scales for valence from 1 (extremely positive)t o4
(neutral)t o7( extremely negative) and vividness from 1 (extremely
vivid)t o7( not at all vivid). We selected 15 positive and 15
negative scenarios that were matched for intensity of valence and
vividness, and significantly different in terms of positive versus
negative valence; positive items, M  1.76, SD  0.40; negative
items, M  6.03, SD  0.49; t(9)  22.00, p  .01.
In the DR-mode condition, participants were instructed as fol-
lows for each scenario: “I would like you to think about why it
happened, and to analyze the causes, meanings, and implications
of this event.” In the A-DR–mode condition, participants were
instructed as follows for each scenario: “I would like you to focus
on how it happened, and to imagine in your mind as vividly and
concretely as possible a ‘movie’ of how this event unfolded.”
Thus, DR mode was characterized by high-level construals,
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native configuration by focusing on low-level construals. Given
that the training conditions were matched for degree of self-
reference, we did not expect any difference in the magnitude of
self-focus induced by the different training conditions.
Prior to the main training phase, all of the participants practiced
adopting the assigned mode on the same (negative) practice sce-
nario and described what they were thinking during the practice.
Where necessary, further feedback and practice were given to
ensure that participants understood the instructions and were
adopting the appropriate mode before training started.
Anagram stress task—failure feedback. The failure-feedback
task consisted of an anagram solution task, consisting of 15 hard-
to-solve anagrams and 15 insoluble anagrams, each five letters
long. Participants were given 3 min to unscramble as many ana-
grams as possible into real words. Before starting the task, partic-
ipants were told that on average five to six anagrams are correctly
solved in 3 min and that performance on this task is a consistent
and reliable indicator of future academic and career success. Ver-
sions of this task have reliably been found to induce negative mood
in previous studies (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy,
& Holker, 2002). All participants were told how many anagrams
they had solved correctly (on average, 1 out of 30) and that they
had scored well below average.
Mood measure. To measure negative mood, we used a visual
analogue scale on which participants rated level of despondency
from 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely). This measure has been
previously found to be a reliable and sensitive self-report measure
of negative mood (e.g., MacLeod et al., 2002; Watkins & Teas-
dale, 2001, 2004).
Self-focus measure. To assess self-focus, we used a visual
analogue scale on which participants rated how much their think-
ing was focused on themselves on a 0–100 scale ranging from 0
(not at all self-focused) to 100 (totally self-focused).
BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report
instrument developed to measure severity of depression in adults
and adolescents (range  0–63).
Manipulation check for level-of-construal processing configu-
ration. To check whether training successfully induced the in-
tended mode of processing, participants were given one interper-
sonal vignette (“A disagreement with your boss”) from the Means
Ends Problem Solving Task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1972, 1975),
and asked to generate the ideal strategy for overcoming the prob-
lem situation (Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992). A judge un-
aware of condition scored each participant’s description of his or
her problem solutions on the Sto ¨ber and Borkovec (2002) abstract–
concrete scale. The descriptions are rated on a 1–5 Likert scale, on
which 1  abstract,2 somewhat abstract,3 neither–nor,4
somewhat concrete,5 concrete. Concrete thought is defined as
“distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, singular” and
abstract thought as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, un-
clear, aggregated” (Sto ¨ber & Borkovec, 2002, p. 92). Thus, the
abstract–concrete scale accurately captures the dimension of high-
level versus low-level construals: More abstract ratings reflect
general, superordinate, and decontextualized representations,
which are more consistent with high-level construals than with
low-level construals. There was good interrater reliability with an
independent second judge who was also unaware of condition
(agreement across all responses was r  .95, .91).
Procedure
Each participant was seen individually. Participants were given
the rationale that the researchers were examining the processes of
imagination, visualization, and cognition. After giving written
informed consent, participants completed the BDI and SCID,
followed by the first self-report measures of despondency and
self-focus (pretraining measures). Participants then worked
through their assigned experimental training condition before re-
peating the self-report measures (posttraining measures). Partici-
pants then completed the MEPS problem vignette followed by
further self-report measures (prestress measures). Participants then
attempted the anagram stress task, before completing the self-
report measures again (poststress measures). Finally, open-ended
questions investigated what the participants thought the study was
testing; no participants guessed that the training phase was de-
signed to shift the response to the failure stress task.
Results
Following MacLeod et al. (2002) and Wilson, MacLeod,
Mathews, and Rutherford (2006), the analysis of the data is orga-
nized sequentially to address whether the training procedures were
effective at inducing the intended processing modes, before ad-
dressing whether the training conditions influenced emotional re-
activity. We need first to determine that the training procedures
were effective at differentially inducing DR mode versus A-DR
mode, before we can analyze the despondency ratings prestress
and poststress to examine whether the manipulation of processing
mode influenced the emotional response to the stressor. For this
and all later experiments, an alpha level of .05 was used for all
statistical tests and all analyses were two-tailed.
Testing the Induction of Different
Processing Configurations
We used ratings of abstractness–concreteness for the descrip-
tions of problem solutions that were written immediately posttrain-
ing to index the level of construal. A univariate analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with training condition (DR mode vs. A-DR
mode) as the between-groups factor examined the independent
ratings of the concreteness of the solution description to determine
whether the training succeeded in differentially inducing process-
ing modes that varied in level of construal. There was a significant
main effect of condition on ratings of concreteness, F(1, 38) 
10.13, p  .005, reflecting that solution descriptions were rated as
more abstract in the DR-mode condition (M  2.85, SD  0.59)
than in the A-DR–mode condition (M  3.45, SD  0.60). This
result suggests that DR-mode training induced a processing con-
figuration characterized by higher-level construals than A-DR–
mode training.
Self-focus. We examined the visual analogue ratings of self-
focus to determine whether induction of self-focus varied between
the training conditions using a mixed-design 2  2 ANOVA, with
Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-
groups factor and Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as the
repeated-measures factor. Consistent with our prediction that the
training conditions would not differ in the extent to which they
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obtained (all Fs  1.30).
Testing Emotional Responses
As noted by MacLeod et al. (2002), the training procedure itself
could act as a direct mood induction. Therefore, we followed the
two-step approach to analysis adopted by MacLeod et al. (2002) to
assess the effects of training on emotional reactivity. First, we
analyzed data from the despondency scales administered before
and after the training task, to determine whether the training
conditions induced differential levels of despondency. Then, we
analyzed the data from the despondency ratings administered
before and after the anagram stress task, to test the hypothesis that
the training conditions would modify emotional reactivity. The
despondency scores at each assessment point during the training
phase and the stress phase are shown in Table 1.
Despondency during training phase. A mixed-design 2  2
ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as
the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as
the repeated-measures factor, and rating of despondency as the
dependent variable, found a significant main effect of time, F(1,
38)  11.31, p  .005, reflecting an increase in despondency
across the training phase for both conditions (see Table 1). Of
particular importance, there was no main effect of Training Con-
dition, nor a significant interaction of Training Condition  Time
(F  1 in both cases). Thus, it appears that the training procedures
had no significant differential influence on despondency, suggest-
ing that the manipulation of processing mode did not have a direct
mood-induction effect.
Emotional reactivity. A mixed-design 2  2 ANOVA, with
Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the between-
groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) as the repeated-
measures factor, and rating of despondency as the dependent
variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) 
14.86, p  .001, qualified by a significant interaction of Condi-
tion  Time, F(1, 38)  4.72, p  .05. This interaction reflected
a significant increase in despondency from prestress to poststress
in the DR-mode condition, t(19)  3.70, p  .002 (95% CI, 9.33,
33.67), but a nonsignificant increase in despondency in the A-DR–
mode condition, t(19)  1.45, p  .16, (95% CI, 2.64, 14.64).
Discussion
These findings provide encouraging support for the hypothesis
that processing mode may causally modify emotional reactivity:
Inducing a processing mode involving high-level construals pro-
duced greater emotional response to a subsequent stressful event
than inducing a processing configuration involving low-level con-
struals. The training procedure appeared to be effective in manip-
ulating processing configuration: Compared to the A-DR–mode
condition, the DR-mode condition produced more abstract and
general descriptions of problem solutions on the MEPS posttrain-
ing, consistent with inducing a mode characterized by high-level
construals.
The results found for the despondency ratings across the training
phase indicate that, as expected, the manipulation of processing
mode did not influence mood: the two training conditions did not
differ in their effects on despondency. Furthermore, the two train-
ing conditions did not differ in the extent to which they induced
self-focus. These findings demonstrate that the manipulation of
training condition had neither a direct mood-induction effect nor a
direct effect on self-focus. Critically, the induction of the different
processing configurations modified emotional reactivity: Inducing
DR mode resulted in a greater increase in despondency in response
to the subsequent anagram stress task than inducing A-DR mode.
This finding extends the Moberly and Watkins (2006) results by
demonstrating that more extensive training delivered in an indi-
vidual format has a main effect on modifying emotional reactivity.
One issue unresolved in Experiment 1 is whether the differential
effect observed between the two training conditions is due to the
DR-mode condition actively increasing emotional reactivity, due
to the A-DR–mode condition actively reducing emotional reactiv-
ity, or due to a combination of both these processes. In Experiment
1, there was no control condition where processing mode was not
trained, which is necessary to distinguish between these possibil-
ities. Therefore, to explore the active roles of the different modes,
in Experiment 2, we introduced a no-training control condition.
Failure and unexpected outcomes, such as those produced in the
anagram stressor task, can temporarily increase the use of higher-
level construals in the form of “why” questions that are concerned
with attributing the cause of the outcome (Wicklund, 1986; Wong
& Weiner, 1981). Therefore, we predicted that the anagram stres-
sor test would spontaneously lead to higher-level construals for
participants in the no-training control condition, and that the no-
training control condition would increase emotional reactivity to a
similar degree as the DR-mode condition and to a lesser degree
than the A-DR–mode condition.
Experiment 2
The principal purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the
central finding of Experiment 1. The same training procedure and
anagram stress task were used in Experiment 2 as were used in
Experiment 1, except that we added a no-training control condition.
Method
Overview
The same design and materials as for Experiment 1 were used,
except that participants were randomly allocated to three condi-
Table 1
Despondency Scores During Training Phase and Stress Phase in
Experiment 1
Variable
Training condition
DR mode
a A-DR mode
b
MS DMS D
Pretraining despondency 9.50 16.05 9.00 12.52
Posttraining despondency 16.50 18.14 17.50 18.32
Prestress despondency 18.50 20.07 15.00 20.65
Poststress despondency 40.00 29.56 21.00 21.98
Note. DR  mode consistent with depressive rumination; A-DR  mode
antithetical to depressive rumination.
a4 male, 16 female;
b6 male, 14 female.
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Participants
Sixty-three naı ¨ve participants were recruited, using the same
selection criteria as Experiment 1, from community volunteers and
undergraduates, and assigned randomly to the DR-mode (n  21),
the A-DR–mode (n  21), or the control no-training condition
(n  21; age, M  23.21, SD  9.14; 13 male, 49 female; BDI,
M  4.37, SD  2.98). Participants were rewarded for taking part
with either £10 ($20) or course credits. There were no differences
between the three conditions on any of the baseline measures, all
Fs  1.1, smallest p  .34. A chi-squared analysis revealed that
there was no difference in the gender distribution across the
conditions, p  .51.
Materials
Level-of-construal training conditions. Participants in the con-
trol nontraining condition worked through the same 30 scenarios
as the other participants, and as in Experiment 1. They were
instructed as follows: “I would now like you to spend a minute
concentrating on this text. Specifically, I would like you to count
the number of verbs that occur in the description of this event.”
These instructions were chosen to ensure that participants read the
text, without inducing either DR mode or A-DR mode.
Manipulation check for processing configuration. We re-
peated the use of the MEPS scenario with the rating of concrete-
ness of solution description as a manipulation check for the pro-
cessing configuration adopted posttraining. There was good
interrater reliability with an independent second judge who was
unaware of condition (agreement across all responses was r  .72,
.73).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. Open-ended ques-
tions investigated what the participants thought the study was
testing; no participants guessed that the training phase was de-
signed to shift the response to the failure task.
Results
The same sequence of analysis as used in Experiment 1 was
repeated for Experiment 2.
Testing the Induction of Different
Processing Configurations
Ratings of abstractness–concreteness. As predicted, an
ANOVA with training condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs.
no-training control) as the between-groups factor revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of training condition on the rating of concrete-
ness of solution descriptions, F(2, 60)  4.64, p  .05. Post hoc
Tukey’s tests revealed that this main effect reflected the solution
descriptions being rated as more concrete in the A-DR–mode
condition (M  3.43, SD  0.81) than in the DR-mode condition
(M  2.90, SD  0.44), p  .05 (95% CI, 0.10, 0.95), replicating
Experiment 1. The no-training control condition (M  3.05, SD 
0.38) did not significantly differ from the DR-mode condition, p 
.70 (95% CI, 0.28, 0.57), whereas there was a trend for the
A-DR–mode condition to be more concrete than the no-training
control, p  .09 (95% CI, 0.81, 0.05).
Self-focus. A mixed-design 3  2 ANOVA, with Training
Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training control) as
the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) as
the repeated-measures factor, and self-focus ratings as the depen-
dent variable, revealed no significant main effects or interactions;
all Fs  1. These findings suggest that there was no difference in
self-focus between the training conditions.
Testing Emotional Responses
Despondency during training phase. The scores obtained on
the despondency scales in each training condition before and after
the training phase and before and after the anagram stress task are
presented in Table 2. A mixed-design 3  2 ANOVA, with
Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training
control) as the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. post-
training) as the repeated-measures factor, and with rating of de-
spondency as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main
effect of time, F(1, 60)  7.90, p  .01, reflecting an increase in
despondency across the training phase for all three conditions. Of
particular importance, there was not a significant interaction of
Condition  Time, F(2, 60)  0.19, p  .83, suggesting that the
manipulation of processing configuration did not have a direct
mood-induction effect.
Emotional reactivity. A mixed-design 3  2 ANOVA, with
Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode vs. no-training
control) as the between-groups factor, Time (prestress vs. post-
stress) as the repeated-measures factor, and with rating of despon-
dency as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect
of time, F(1, 60)  59.31, p  .001, qualified by a significant
interaction of Condition  Time, F(2, 60)  3.82, p  .05. This
interaction reflected the absence of a significant main effect of Train-
ing Condition at the prestress assessment, F(2, 60)  1.28, p  .29,
but a significant main effect of Training Condition at the poststress
assessment, F(2, 60)  3.44,p .05. The nature of the interaction
is shown in Figure 1. As can be seen, although all three conditions
displayed an increase in despondency in response to the stress task,
relative to the DR-mode and no-training control conditions, the
Table 2
Despondency Scores During Training Phase and Stress Phase in
Experiment 2
Variable
Condition
DR mode
a A-DR mode
b No training
c
MS DMS DMS D
Pretraining despondency 21.19 17.17 18.09 18.54 13.24 16.80
Posttraining despondency 25.24 16.92 23.57 20.44 16.48 18.78
Prestress despondency 25.24 17.78 25.48 21.56 17.38 16.25
Poststress despondency 58.57 23.72 38.09 23.58 47.48 28.39
Note. DR  mode consistent with depressive rumination; A-DR  mode
antithetical to depressive rumination.
a4 male, 17 female;
b6 male, 15 female;
c3 male, 18 female.
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extending the finding from Experiment 1. As predicted, the no-
training control condition paralleled the effects of the DR-mode
condition, with a very similar pattern of despondency change
across the stress phase, albeit starting at a lower prestress level of
despondency. Post hoc Tukey’s tests showed that the increase in
despondency from prestress to poststress was significantly greater
in the DR-mode condition than in the A-DR–mode condition, p 
.05 (95% CI, 1.34, 40.09), replicating Experiment 1. Moreover, as
predicted, the increase in despondency from prestress to poststress
did not differ between the DR-mode and no-training control con-
ditions, p  .91 (95% CI, 16.14, 22.61). There was a trend for
the increase in despondency from prestress to poststress to be
greater in the no-training control condition than the A-DR–mode
condition, p  .08 (95% CI, 1.90, 36.85).
Discussion
The principal aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the main
finding of Experiment 1. Experiment 2 was successful in this aim:
The results of Experiment 2 confirm the ability of the training
procedure to manipulate level of construal and modify emotional
reactivity. Replicating Experiment 1, compared to the A-DR–
mode condition, the DR-mode condition produced more abstract
descriptions of problem solutions on the MEPS posttraining, indi-
cating successful induction of the differential processing configu-
rations. Furthermore, replicating Experiment 1, the manipulation
of processing configuration had no direct mood-induction effect,
with the three conditions not differing in their effects on despon-
dency. Nonetheless, once again, inducing DR mode resulted in
greater subsequent emotional reactivity than inducing A-DR mode.
The addition of the no-training control condition provided in-
formation about the default processing mode adopted by this
sample of nonclinical participants, and about the relative contri-
butions of the two training manipulations in modifying emotional
reactivity. First, the no-training control condition did not signifi-
cantly differ from the DR-mode condition on the posttraining
rating of abstractness–concreteness of the problem description,
and showed a trend to be more abstract than the A-DR–mode
condition. This result suggests that the default response of the
untrained participants prior to the anagram stressor is similar to
that of participants in the DR-mode condition. This may be be-
cause nonclinical participants spontaneously adopt a higher-level
construal style, consistent with extensive findings that individuals
tend by default to use more abstract construals (Wegner & Valla-
cher, 1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986) and use
a more global, abstract processing style in neutral and happy
moods (Beukeboom & Semin, 2005; Bless et al., 1996; Gasper &
Clore, 2002; Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Alternatively, in this non-
clinical sample, it may have been relatively easier to induce A-DR
mode than to induce DR mode.
Second, the confidence intervals suggest that the effects of
no-training control condition on emotional reactivity overlapped
with the effects of the DR-mode condition but were distinct from
the effects of the A-DR–mode condition, although there was not a
significant (p  .05) difference between A-DR mode and no-
training control. This pattern is broadly consistent with the pre-
diction that participants in the no-training control condition would
spontaneously adopt higher-level construals in response to the
unexpected failure (Wong & Weiner, 1981), although this is a
tentative interpretation that requires replication. Assuming that the
response following the no-training control reflects the default
response to failure, these results suggest that prior A-DR training
reduces this default response to failure (i.e., abstract processing
and elevated emotional reactivity), suggesting that training in
A-DR mode has some active effect. Nonetheless, because the
default mode adopted in the no-training control is similar to the
DR mode, it is unclear whether the A-DR mode would have a
beneficial effect when compared to a more neutral nonruminative
control condition.
Experiments 1 and 2 both suggested that the manipulation of
processing mode modifies emotional reactivity. Moreover, consis-
tent with the hypothesis that level of construal is an important
property discriminating between DR mode and A-DR mode, ex-
plicit instructions designed to produce low-level construals re-
sulted in less emotional reactivity than explicit instructions de-
signed to produce high-level construals. Experiment 3 further
tested the level-of-construal hypothesis by manipulating process-
ing mode via a different method that is nevertheless conceptually
consistent with inducing high-level versus low-level construals. If
a methodologically different training manipulation that is also
conceptually consistent with shifting level of construal is able to
replicate these effects on emotional reactivity, this provides further
confirmation that level of construal may be a key active property
within the different processing modes.
The manipulations in Experiments 1 and 2 involved explicit,
voluntary, and transparent mental generation of the different pro-
cessing configurations. Therefore, in Experiment 3 we adopted a
more implicit training protocol in which participants were guided
more covertly into the different modes to test whether we could
conceptually replicate the finding that processing mode influences
emotional reactivity. To do this, we adapted a computerized task
used to induce interpretative bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000):
Whereas the original task forced participants to make either a
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Figure 1. Effect of anagram stress task on despondency after processing-
mode training in Experiment 2.
370 WATKINS, MOBERLY, AND MOULDSnegative or a positive interpretation of otherwise ambiguous texts,
our version forced participants to make interpretations of other-
wise ambiguous texts that involved either high-level construals or
low-level construals. In an unpublished pilot study using this
paradigm with 40 participants, we found that the DR-mode and
A-DR–mode conditions differentially influenced the ability to
generate the reasons why a behavior was performed versus how it
was performed (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Consistent with the
intended processing configurations, the DR-mode condition sig-
nificantly increased the number of “why’s” generated but reduced
the number of “how’s” generated, relative to the A-DR–mode
condition. Thus, these pilot data provide initial evidence that this
interpretative-bias training paradigm can successfully induce high-
level versus low-level construals.
A further aim of Experiment 3 was to examine whether our
previous findings would generalize to a more inclusive sample and
to a wider range of moods. To this end, we used a sample with
relatively higher levels of depressive symptoms compared to the
first two experiments. Moreover, instead of a single self-rating of
despondency, we used the Positive and Negative Adjective Sched-
ule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess mood.
The inclusion of the PANAS allowed us to check that we could
replicate our previous findings on a more elaborate and method-
ologically superior measure that encompassed more facets of pos-
itive and negative mood, including aspects of negative affect that
are not necessarily related to depression (e.g., high arousal).
Experiment 3
Method
Overview
The training phase of this paradigm consisted of the following:
1. Participants read 64 computer-presented short descrip-
tions of social situations that remain ambiguous in overall
meaning, until the final word, presented as a fragment to
be completed, which resolved the overall meaning for
each scenario;
2. Across all the scenarios, each word fragment was chosen
to lead the participant into making the required interpre-
tation for the intended training condition;
3. Following each scenario, participants answered a subse-
quent comprehension question designed to further rein-
force the required interpretation.
Whereas Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) induced positive
versus negative interpretations, we induced interpretations consis-
tent with high-level construals (DR mode) or with low-level con-
struals (A-DR mode). In other respects, we followed the method-
ology described by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000; see
Experiment 1 for full details).
Participants
Forty naı ¨ve participants were recruited from a panel of under-
graduate volunteers (age, M  19.38, SD  1.46; 12 male, 28
female). Participants were rewarded for taking part with either £6
($12) or course credits. We included participants with minimal to
moderate levels of depression symptoms (BDI-II score  25;
mean BDI score  9.88, SD  6.31). The participants were
randomly allocated to two training conditions designed, respec-
tively, to induce DR mode and A-DR mode. There were no
differences between the two conditions on any of the baseline
measures (BDI, age, initial positive affect, initial negative affect),
all Fs  1.16, smallest p  .28. The two training conditions were
matched for gender (14 females and 6 males in each condition).
Materials
Interpretative-bias training conditions. The 64 training de-
scriptions consisted of two or three sentences and remained am-
biguous in terms of whether they suggested an interpretation
consistent with DR mode or with A-DR until the final word
fragment, which alone determined the processing configuration.
Each fragment only allowed one completion, which was congruent
with the required processing configuration. Of the descriptions, 32
were positive in valence and 32 were negative in valence, to ensure
that the training phase was not intrinsically mood inducing. Across
the descriptions, the DR-mode completions disambiguated the
sentences so as to generate meanings for each description that were
abstract, general, evaluative, judgmental, and conceptual. In con-
trast, the A-DR–mode completions disambiguated the sentences so
as to generate meanings for each description that were concrete,
specific, experiential, and sensory focused. For example, one neg-
ative description read as follows (with final words and condition in
parentheses):
You are running a bath when you become distracted by a telephone
call and forget to turn off the tap. The bath floods and the water begins
to drip through the ceiling of the room below. Cleaning up the mess,
you feel irritated because you are so w_t [wet, low-level construal,
A-DR mode]/c_reless [careless, high-level construal, DR mode].
Another negative description read as follows:
You have been seeing each other for three weeks, and it seems that
you have found a true soul mate. After dinner one evening, your
partner explains that you can’t be together anymore. At that moment,
you stare at the table and contemplate your empty gl_ss [glass,
low-level construal, A-DR mode]/l-fe [life, high-level construal, DR
mode].
A positive description read as follows:
You are currently romantically unattached and are not expecting the
Valentine’s card that drops through the letterbox one morning. Your
heart warms as it becomes clear that you have a secret admirer.
Getting into the warm bath, you feel very re_axed [relaxed, low-level
construal, A-DR mode]/desir_ble [desirable, high-level construal, DR
mode].
Another positive description read as follows:
Waiting at the railway station, you bump into an old friend of yours
whom you haven’t seen for years. You go for a drink, gossip about old
times and it seems as though you have never been apart. As you shake
hands you feel the strength of his gr_p [grip, low-level construal,
A-DR mode]/lo_alty [loyalty, high-level construal, DR mode].
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experiential, and more sensory focused, describing physical sen-
sations experienced (“wet,” “relaxed,” “grip”) and physical objects
observed (“glass”). In contrast, the DR-mode completions were
more evaluative, abstract, and generalized, including judgments
and global character attributions (“careless,” “desirable,” “compe-
tence”) as well as abstract evaluations of meaning and implications
of events (“life”). Importantly, an equivalent number of positive
and negative completions were used for each training condition to
minimize the likelihood that the training conditions differed on
valence rather than on mode (high-level vs. low-level construals).
Ten independent judges each rated all of the scenarios (half the
scenarios disambiguated with DR-mode completions and half dis-
ambiguated with A-DR–mode completions, disambiguation for
each scenario counterbalanced across the judges) on a series of 1–9
Likert scales chosen to check that the disambiguated completions
were consistent with the intended configuration. The scales as-
sessed each completed scenario for (a) self-focus from 1 (not at all
self-focused)t o9( very self-focused); (b) focus on sensory details
from 1 (not at all sensory)t o9( extremely sensory); (c) evaluation
of meanings and implications from 1 (not at all)t o9( extremely);
and (d) use of situation-specific, state-like to more global trait-like
attributions from 1 (extremely state-like)t o9( extremely trait-like).
Consistent with the intended manipulations, on average, relative to
the A-DR–mode completions, the DR-mode completions were
rated as significantly less focused on sensory details, t(9)  4.24,
p  .005 (DR mode, M  4.12, SD  0.97; A-DR mode, M 
5.55, SD  0.90), involving more evaluation of meanings and
implications, t(9)  2.19, p  .06 (DR mode, M  6.40, SD 
0.91; A-DR mode, M  5.42, SD  1.27), and involving more
trait-like, global attributions, t(9)  2.24, p  .05 (DR mode, M 
4.49, SD  0.64; A-DR mode, M  3.74, SD  1.01). That is, the
DR-mode completions were more evaluative, abstract, and gener-
alized, including judgments and character-level attributions con-
sistent with higher-level construals, than the A-DR–mode comple-
tions. The DR-mode and A-DR–mode completions were matched
for self-focus, t(9)  0.77, p  .46 (DR mode, M  6.16, SD 
0.59; A-DR mode, M  6.00, SD  0.87).
To progress to the next description, participants had to cor-
rectly type in the missing letter of the fragment and then
respond to a comprehension question about the description. The
comprehension questions were designed to induce the intended
processing configuration further. For example, for the first
negative passage shown above, the question in the A-DR–mode
condition was “Do you manage to keep yourself dry?” which
focused on concrete details of the experience. In contrast, in the
DR-mode condition, the question was “Do you think that you
are not to blame?” which focused on more abstract evaluations
and judgments about what had happened. Participants had 10 s
to respond either “Yes” or “No” following each question.
Answers were followed by feedback (a “correct” or “wrong”
message) consistent with the intended processing mode, both
when generating a response to the word fragment and when
answering the comprehension question.
Recognition test. The training descriptions were immediately
followed by another set of 18 brief descriptions of social situations,
each negative, different in context from the training situations,
headed with a brief identifying title, and presented in random
order. Unlike the training descriptions, which directed participants
toward a particular mode of responding, the recognition descrip-
tions, while superficially similar to the training descriptions, used
word fragments whose completion allowed either a high-level
construal, DR-mode interpretation, or a low-level construal,
A-DR–mode interpretation, leaving participants free to generate
their own response. A sample identifying title, test paragraph, and
comprehension question is as follows:
The Wedding Speech
You have been asked to give a speech at your best friend’s wedding
reception. You are poorly prepared and make many hesitations and
slips while speaking. Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a
distant murmur of voic_s [voices].
Is your best friend getting married? (Yes/No)
After participants worked through a short filler task, a
computer-based recognition test was used to assess the inter-
pretations that were made of these paragraphs. In an individu-
ally randomized order, participants read the identifying title of
each test paragraph, followed by four versions of the final
sentence, also in random order. Two of these sentences re-
flected plausible interpretations of the paragraph (“target” in-
terpretations), one consistent with high-level construals (DR
mode) and the other consistent with low-level construals (A-DR
mode). Two of these sentences reflected implausible interpre-
tations of the paragraph (“foil” interpretations), one consistent
with DR mode and the other consistent with A-DR mode. For
example, for the title and test paragraph presented above, the
recognition sentences were:
(a) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of
words (target, low-level construal, A-DR mode)
(b) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of
disapproval (target, high-level construal, DR mode)
(c) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of
aircraft (foil, low-level construal, A-DR mode)
(d) Looking into the crowd of faces, you hear a distant murmur of
resentment (foil, high-level construal, DR mode)
Participants were told that none of the sentences were identical
to those in the original paragraph, but that any number of them
could be similar in meaning to the original paragraph. Participants
were instructed to rate each sentence, independently of all others,
for its similarity in meaning to the original sentence using a 4-point
scale, ranging from 1 (very different in meaning)t o4( very similar
in meaning).
Ten independent raters rated the plausible recognition targets
(half of each mode, DR mode vs. A-DR mode, counterbalanced
across raters) and 10 independent raters rated the implausible
recognition foils (half of each mode, DR mode vs. A-DR mode,
counterbalanced across raters), with the Likert scales used to rate
the processing configuration of the training completions. We ex-
amined these ratings using a mixed-design 2  2 ANOVA, with
Sentence Target (target interpretation vs. foil interpretation) as the
between-subjects factor, and Sentence Meaning (DR mode vs.
A-DR mode) as the within-subjects factor. As intended, there were
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Relative to the recognition sentences designed to be consistent
with A-DR mode, the recognition sentences designed to be con-
sistent with DR mode were rated as significantly less sensory
focused, F(1, 18)  16.65, p  .001 (DR mode, M  4.18, SD 
1.44; A-DR mode, M  5.64, SD  1.20), involving significantly
more evaluation of meanings and implications, F(1, 18)  15.43,
p  .001 (DR mode, M  6.34, SD  0.98; A-DR mode, M 
5.02, SD  1.23) and involving significantly more global, trait-
level attributions, F(1, 18)  5.93, p  .05 (DR mode, M  4.49,
SD  1.23; A-DR mode, M  3.68, SD  1.59). Thus, the
different recognition sentences do seem to index the intended
processing configurations, with the DR-mode recognition sen-
tences reflecting higher-level construals than the A-DR–mode
recognition sentences.
Mood measure—positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS;
Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS consists of two 10-item scales
measuring positive affect (e.g., “interested,” “excited,” “proud”)
and negative affect (e.g., “distressed,” “upset,” “scared”). In this
experiment, each item is rated for the extent to which the partic-
ipant feels that way right now on a 9-point scale from 1 (very
slightly/not at all)t o9( extremely). The PANAS has been found to
be a reliable and valid measure of mood (Watson et al., 1988) and
has been used extensively in experimental research.
Anagram stressor task—failure feedback. The failure-
feedback task was a computerized version of the anagram-solution
task used in Experiments 1 and 2 that included only the 15 solvable
anagrams. The instructions informed participants that performance
was related to intelligence and academic and career success and
that they were expected to solve about 40–60% of the anagrams.
During the task, each of the anagrams was presented for 20 s, after
which participants were given 10 s to type in the solution. The
computer then displayed “correct” or “incorrect” feedback, to-
gether with the correct solution and the proportion of anagrams
solved so far. All participants solved fewer than 40% of the
anagrams (M  15.5%, SD  11.1%, range  0–33%).
Procedure
Each participant was seen individually. Participants were given
the rationale that the researchers were examining the processes of
imagination, visualization, and cognition. After giving written
informed consent, participants completed the BDI, and then com-
pleted the first PANAS measure of mood, which was administered
via computer (pretraining measure). Participants then worked
through the training phase in their assigned experimental condi-
tion. After all the training descriptions had been completed, par-
ticipants began the recognition descriptions. This was followed by
a 2-min unrelated filler task, (a computerized version of the speed
of comprehension test; Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992)
in which participants made judgments as rapidly as possible as to
whether sentences were true or false (e.g., “Admirals are people,”
“Beef steaks are footwear”). After this, participants completed the
recognition ratings, with instructions emphasizing the need to rate
each sentence independently of the others. A further computer-
based PANAS measure of mood (posttraining/prestress measure)
was then completed. Participants then attempted the anagram task
designed to induce the experience of failure, before rating their
mood again via the computerized PANAS (poststress measure).
The computer software E-Prime was used to administer the study
materials and to collect participants’ responses.
Results
The same sequence of analysis used in Experiments 1 and 2 was
repeated in Experiment 3.
Testing the Induction of Different Processing
Configurations—Recognition Ratings
We calculated a level-of-construal index consisting of the rat-
ings for the high-level construal (DR mode) recognition statements
minus the ratings for the low-level construal (A-DR mode) recog-
nition statements, such that higher scores on the index indicate a
greater endorsement of higher-level construals consistent with DR
mode. If the manipulation was successful, participants trained in
the DR mode would have higher scores on this level-of-construal
index than participants trained in the A-DR mode.
A mixed-design ANOVA with Training Condition as the
between-subjects factor (DR mode vs. A-DR mode), sentence
target (plausible target interpretation vs. implausible foil interpre-
tation) as the within-subject factor, and the level-of-construal
index as the dependent variable revealed a large main effect of
target, F(1, 38)  31.78, p  .01, indicating higher level-of-
construal index for implausible rather than plausible interpreta-
tions. Critically, as predicted, there was a significant main effect of
condition, F(1, 38)  8.11, p  .01, reflecting more endorsement
of high-level construals in DR mode (M  0.35, SD  0.29) than
in A-DR mode (M  0.09, SD  0.28). The interaction between
target and condition was not significant, F(1, 38)  1.63, ns. These
results provide confirmation that the DR-mode condition was
successful in inducing a mind-set more characteristic of depressive
rumination than the A-DR–mode condition.
Testing Emotional Responses
Mood state during training phase. The scores obtained on the
positive and negative affect scales in each training condition
before and after the training phase and before and after the stress
phase are presented in Table 3. A mixed-design 2  2  2
ANOVA, with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as
the between-groups factor, Time (pretraining vs. posttraining) and
Scale Type (positive affect vs. negative affect) as the repeated-
measures factors, and score on each affect scale as the dependent
variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1, 38) 
61.46, p  .001, reflecting reductions in both positive and negative
affect across the training phase in both conditions. There was also
a significant main effect of scale type, F(1, 38)  90.17, p  .001,
reflecting lower scores on the negative-affect scale than on the
positive-affect scale. Of particular importance, there was not a signif-
icant two-way interaction of Condition  Time, F(1, 38)  1.90,
1 There were few other significant main effects or interactions: There
were no interactions of Sentence Target by Sentence Meaning, all Fs  1,
and only one significant main effect of Sentence Target, F(1, 18)  6.30,
p  .05, with the evaluation of meanings and implications as the dependent
variable, reflecting foils being rated as less focused on meanings and
implications than targets.
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Time  Scale Type, F(1, 38)  0.09, p  .77. These results
indicate that there was no direct mood-induction effect of manip-
ulating processing configuration and that both training conditions
had equivalent direct mood-induction effects on positive and neg-
ative affect. No other significant effects were obtained from the
ANOVA (all Fs  1).
Emotional reactivity. A mixed-design 2  2  2 ANOVA,
with Training Condition (DR mode vs. A-DR mode) as the
between-groups factor, Time (prestress vs. poststress) and Scale
Type (positive affect vs. negative affect) as the repeated-measures
factor, and scores on each affect scale as the dependent variable,
revealed a significant main effect of scale type, F(1, 38)  33.54,
p  .001, qualified by a significant interaction of Scale Type 
Time, F(1, 38)  41.43, p  .001. The main effect reflected
elevated scores on the positive-affect scale compared to the
negative-affect scale, while the interaction reflected an increase in
negative affect from prestress to poststress but a decrease in
positive affect from prestress to poststress, confirming the effec-
tiveness of the anagram stressor as a mood induction. Of greater
relevance to the hypothesis under test, these effects were subsumed
within a significant higher-order Training Condition  Scale Type 
Time interaction, F(1, 38)  10.32, p  .005. The significance of this
interaction means that the degree to which the anagram stress task
increased negative affect and reduced positive affect was modified
in different ways for participants in each training condition. Cal-
culation of component effects demonstrated that this higher-order
interaction was due to significant interactions of Condition 
Time for each Scale Type, but acting in opposite directions. Thus,
for the positive-affect scale, there was a significant interaction of
Condition  Time, F(1, 38)  8.34, p  .01, which reflected a
significantly greater decrease in positive affect from prestress to
poststress in the DR-mode condition, t(19)  7.71, p  .001 (95%
CI for decrease in positive affect, 8.23, 14.37), than in the A-DR–
mode condition, t(19)  2.03, p  .06 (95% CI, - 0.12, 8.32). In
contrast, for the negative-affect scale, there was a significant
interaction of Condition  Time, F(1, 38)  5.91, p  .05, which
reflected a significantly greater increase in negative affect from
prestress to poststress in the DR-mode condition, t(19)  3.89, p 
.001 (95% CI for increase in negative affect, 5.35, 17.85), than in
the A-DR–mode condition, t(19)  2.48, p  .05 (95% CI, 0.55,
6.55). Figure 2 illustrates the simple interaction for negative affect.
These results confirm that the training conditions had a differential
influence on emotional reactivity to the subsequent anagram stres-
sor task.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 further support the processing-
mode theory. They replicate our previous findings that inducing
A-DR mode reduced subsequent emotional reactivity relative to
inducing DR mode. Further, this replication strengthens the pre-
vious findings because Experiment 3: (a) used a means of training
processing mode that, although conceptually consistent with the
previous manipulations, was more implicit; and (b) replicated the
findings on the PANAS, a more detailed and well-validated mea-
sure of positive and negative affect. Moreover, the recognition
sentences measure confirmed that the DR-mode training condition
produced greater endorsements of sentences consistent with high-
level construals than the A-DR–mode training condition, indicat-
ing that the manipulation of processing mode was successful.
General Discussion
In a series of three experiments, we have shown that when one
is focused on emotional scenarios, compared to inducing a mind-
set characteristic of that observed in depressive rumination, induc-
ing a mind-set antithetical to that observed in depressive rumina-
tion reduces subsequent emotional reactivity. These findings are
consistent with our principal hypothesis that processing mode
modifies emotional response to a stressful event.
Across all three experiments, the pattern of results indicates that
the two distinct training procedures were effective in manipulating
the level of construal adopted by participants in the intended
direction. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in the DR-mode
condition produced more abstract and general solution descrip-
tions, consistent with the processing configuration characteristic of
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Figure 2. Effect of anagram stress task on negative affect after
interpretative-bias training in Experiment 3.
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Affect Scores by Condition
and Time in Experiment 3
Variable
Condition
DR mode A-DR mode
MS DMS D
Pretraining positive affect 51.70 9.94 53.05 13.41
Posttraining positive affect 46.30 14.33 45.00 16.29
Poststress positive affect 35.00 14.95 40.90 18.65
Pretraining negative affect 23.60 11.91 25.80 16.56
Posttraining negative affect 19.05 11.34 19.65 11.85
Poststress negative affect 30.65 17.11 23.20 13.13
Note. DR  mode consistent with depressive rumination; A-DR  mode
antithetical to depressive rumination.
374 WATKINS, MOBERLY, AND MOULDSdepressive rumination, than participants in the A-DR–mode con-
dition. Critically, this successful manipulation check was (a) on a
non-self-report measure and (b) measured approximately 5 min
after the end of the training phase, indicating that the training
produced a shift in thinking that persisted for at least 5 min and
was maintained despite the transfer of processing to a new task
(problem solving). In Experiment 3, relative to the A-DR–mode
condition, the DR-mode condition resulted in greater endorsement
of recognition statements that disambiguated previously viewed
negative scenarios in a way that was consistent with abstract,
evaluative, and judgmental interpretations of the ambiguous sce-
narios. Again this effect was observed after a filler task, indicating
that training produced a shift in processing that could persist for at
least several minutes and transfer to another task.
Furthermore, these results clearly demonstrate that the different
conditions had differential effects on emotional reactivity. In all
three experiments, the manipulation of processing configuration
had no direct mood-induction effect, with the training conditions
not differing in their effects on mood ratings from pretraining to
posttraining. Furthermore, immediately prior to the anagram stres-
sor task, participants in the different training conditions reported
equivalent levels of negative mood. Rather, the induction of the
different processing configurations influenced emotional reactivity
across the stress phase: Inducing higher-level construals resulted in
a greater increase in negative mood (despondency in Experiments
1 and 2, increases in negative affect and reductions in positive
affect in Experiment 3) in response to the subsequent anagram
stress task than inducing lower-level construals.
We believe it unlikely that our findings could be the result of the
DR-mode condition inducing participants to be more self-focused
than the A-DR–mode condition, and thereby influencing emotional
reactivity (Ingram, 1990). First, across all three studies, the emo-
tional scenarios used were identical across the training conditions
and each equally focused on self. Second, in both Experiments 1
and 2, we found that there was no difference between the training
conditions in their effects on self-focus.
One might also argue that experimental demand may have
contributed to the observed findings. Although some contribution
of experimental demand can never be completely ruled out, we
believe that it is unlikely that experimental demand was responsi-
ble for our results. First, none of our participants deduced that the
training conditions were designed to influence their response to the
anagram task, nor did they comment that the training scenarios
were biased in any particular way. Second, as MacLeod et al.
(2002) have argued, it seems implausible that experimental de-
mand would lead to an effect of training only by influencing the
emotional response to a subsequent stressor but not to a direct
effect of training on mood. Third, whereas Experiments 1 and 2
had explicit training conditions, which potentially could have
produced demand effects in participants, Experiment 3 had an
implicit training procedure, with participants receiving no explicit
instructions to alter their thinking about emotional events.
Importantly, the training procedure in Experiment 3 was de-
signed to be methodologically different but conceptually equiva-
lent in terms of inducing DR mode versus A-DR mode with
respect to the training procedures in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus,
the fact that all three experiments replicate the same main findings
despite these methodological differences reduces the likelihood
that the observed effects are due to idiosyncrasies of experimental
method or artifacts of each training procedure, and strengthens the
argument that the observed findings are consistent with the pro-
posed hypothesis. In all three studies, the DR-mode training con-
ditions focused on inducing high-level construals such as abstract
and general implications and meanings of events, evaluations, and
judgments, which are characteristic of the phenomenology of
depressive rumination, whereas the A-DR–mode condition in-
duced low-level construals with a focus on the concrete, specific,
sensory–perceptual details of how events happen, inconsistent with
depressive rumination. Together these findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that level of construal may be an important dimen-
sion distinguishing between processing modes that result in un-
constructive depressive rumination versus more constructive forms
of self-focus.
An unexpected finding was the observation that in Experiments
1 and 2, despondency increased from pretraining to posttraining,
suggesting that the training acted as a negative mood induction,
despite having equivalent numbers of positive and negative emo-
tional scenarios. This effect was probably not due to an imbalance
of emotional intensity across the scenarios because the positive
scenarios and negative scenarios were matched for intensity of
valence and vividness. This effect may simply be a consequence of
boredom and fatigue after 30 training presentations. Alternatively,
the negative scenarios may be more salient than the positive
scenarios, producing an overall negative mood induction, because
negative information has greater salience and dominance for sub-
sequent responses than positive information (Ito, Larsen, Smith, &
Cacioppo, 1998; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Methodological dif-
ferences between the experiments can explain why the training
phase had a negative mood induction effect in Experiments 1 and
2 but not in Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, the interpretative-bias
training paradigm is more implicit and covert, and, therefore, much
less likely to induce negative mood than the more effortful and
overt training paradigm in Experiments 1 and 2.
The observation that the training phase acted as a negative mood
induction in Experiments 1 and 2 raises the question of why we did
not observe a differential effect on despondency of the two training
conditions during the training phase. After all, we hypothesized
that relative to training participants into DR mode, training par-
ticipants into A-DR mode would reduce emotional reactivity.
Thus, if the training itself acted as a mild stressor, one might
expect to see the training conditions produce differential emotional
responses during training itself. However, two potential accounts
might explain why this effect was not observed. First, the training
phase may not have been a powerful-enough negative mood in-
duction to produce the variations in emotional response necessary
to detect the effects of training condition on emotional reactivity,
unlike the more intense anagram stressor task. The anagram stres-
sor task involves an unexpected, involuntary, and real emotional
experience, whereas the training involves voluntary, deliberate,
and imaginary emotional experience. The anagram stressor task is
thus likely to induce a more intense negative emotion than the
training phase. Further, positive and negative scenarios were de-
liberately balanced in the training phase to minimize any overall
mood-induction effect. Consistent with this account, across Exper-
iments 1 and 2, the anagram stressor task resulted in a mean
increase in despondency three times greater than the mean increase
in despondency during the training phase (see Tables 1 and 2).
Second, it may have taken repeated practice on the training items
375 PROCESSING MODE AND EMOTIONAL REACTIVITYto induce the desired processing mode. Thus, throughout much of
the training phase, the intended processing mode may not have
been fully developed and so could not operate effectively to
influence emotional reactivity.
The current findings have a number of important theoretical
implications. First, our findings provide strong support for the
hypothesis that a mode of processing consistent with that observed
in depressive rumination will result in greater emotional reactivity
than a mode of processing inconsistent with that observed in
depressive rumination. These findings indicate that differences in
the adoption of these processing modes can causally influence
emotional reactivity, at least within a nonclinical population.
These findings are consistent with previous studies that found that
a mode of processing characterized by a configuration of abstract,
comparative, verbally based, evaluative, and “Why?”-type think-
ing produces detrimental consequences during focus on self, feel-
ings, and problems, relative to a processing mode characterized by
a configuration of concrete, process-focused, imagery-based, and
experiential processing (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Rimes &
Watkins, 2005; Treynor et al., 2003; Watkins & Moulds, 2005;
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Taken together, these findings
are consistent with the processing-mode theory, which proposes
that the consequences of depressive rumination, in part, depend on
the particular processing mode adopted during focus on self,
problems, and feelings.
2 Moreover, these findings suggest that
processing mode may be an important element influencing the role
of rumination in emotional reactivity.
Second, the absence of any differential mood-induction effect
between the DR mode and A-DR mode across the training phase
indicates that the abstract, evaluative processing mode consistent
with the phenomenology of depressive rumination is not an inher-
ently maladaptive form of thought. Previous studies have found
that the maladaptive effects of depressive rumination only occur in
dysphoric participants, such that it is the combination of rumina-
tive processing with negative mood that seems to be maladaptive
(e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema
& Morrow, 1993). In the current study we did not select dysphoric
participants or induce negative mood prior to manipulating rumi-
nation, but rather exposed participants to a negative-mood-
inducing event after inducing different processing configurations.
Therefore, we examined the effect of a ruminative mind-set in the
context of a negative mood during the stress phase of the study but
not during the training phase of the study. Thus, our results are
consistent with previous demonstrations that ruminative process-
ing is only maladaptive in the context of dysphoric mood.
Third, Experiment 2 provided some tentative evidence that,
relative to the no-training control condition, the A-DR mode has a
protective effect against emotional reactivity, rather than that the
DR mode exacerbates emotional reactivity. However, it is impor-
tant to note that following failure, the default mode adopted in the
no-training control seems to be similar to the DR mode. Thus, we
do not know if the A-DR mode would have a beneficial effect
when compared to a more neutral nonruminative control condition.
Fourth, the differential effects of the DR and A-DR modes on
emotional reactivity are consistent with our level-of-construal hy-
pothesis. As noted earlier, whereas low-level construals involve
contextualized representations, high-level construals engender
generalizations, such that it is hypothesized that in the context of
a negative event, relative to low-level construals, higher-level
construals are likely to produce negative overgeneralizations. Such
overgeneralizations are implicated in the onset and maintenance of
depression (Beck, 1976; Carver, 1998) and exacerbate emotional
reactivity (Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Within this account, the
mechanism by which the A-DR mode would reduce emotional
reactivity is by producing more concrete, specific mental repre-
sentations that reduce negative overgeneralizations. Consistent
with this hypothesis, inducing specific, concrete modes of thought
results in less emotion to subsequent mood inductions, relative to
inducing more general modes (Philippot et al., 2003, 2006; Raes et
al., 2006). Similarly, these results have implications for cognitive
models highlighting attributional style in vulnerability for depres-
sion, because higher-level construals are consistent with the
global, stable attributions for negative events that are implicated in
the onset of depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978;
Alloy et al., 1999). Thus, level of construal during processing is a
plausible candidate for a potential mediator of the differential
effects of the DR mode versus other modes antithetical to depres-
sive rumination. However, the current experiments were not de-
signed to examine the role of this dimension (or any other dimen-
sion) as a mediator of the training effects. A design similar to that
used by MacLeod et al. (2002, Study 2), in which the response to
the stressor task is examined before and after the training phase is
necessary in order to assess potential mediators of the effects of
training on reactivity.
Finally, an unresolved question concerns whether there is a
potential interaction between processing mode and the valence of
the emotionally eliciting event, such that high-level construals
exacerbate negative emotional responses to negative events but
also exacerbate positive emotional responses to positive events
(see Watkins, in press). Does DR-mode training specifically in-
crease emotional reactivity to negative events, or does training into
DR mode lead to people reading more general implications into
any emotional event relative to A-DR–mode training, such that for
a positive event, the DR-mode training condition would lead to a
greater increase in positive mood? Currently, the evidence is
mixed: Relative to inducing lower-level construals, inducing
higher-level construals can increase the positive emotional re-
sponse to positive events (e.g., compliments, Marigold, Holmes, &
Ross, 2007) or positive mood inductions (Philippot et al., 2003,
2006), although thinking about positive events with lower-level
construals has also been associated with increased positive affect
compared to reappraisal (Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof,
2006).
The current studies were designed as a preliminary test of
whether processing mode influences emotional reactivity, using an
analogue of a negative event in a nonclinical sample. Despite a
number of strengths including a robust experimental methodology
and replication across three studies, there are several limitations.
2 We note that our conceptualization of high-level versus low-level
construals does parallel the subtypes of rumination (brooding, reflective
pondering) reported by Treynor et al. (2003). First, the distinction between
levels of construal reflects a theoretical model, whereas the distinction
between brooding and reflective pondering is atheoretical and derived from
a factor analysis. Second, both brooding and reflective pondering factors
are multidimensional involving focus on self, focus on feelings, and
self-judgment as well as abstract construals. Third, both brooding and
reflective pondering have been associated with depressive symptoms.
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whether the present findings would generalize to more severe
negative events. Second, our experimental sample was predomi-
nantly female, which may limit the extent to which we can gen-
eralize our findings to a male sample. Third, there is the question
of whether the training conditions would have similar effects in
clinical populations, such as people with major depression. All
participants reported depressive symptoms well below clinical
levels, limiting the extent we can generalize our findings to a more
depressed sample. Because Moberly and Watkins (2006) found
that similar training conditions influenced the relationship between
trait rumination and emotional reactivity, and trait rumination is a
known vulnerability factor for depression, we speculate that the
effects of training observed here would extend to individuals with
clinical depression such that training in A-DR mode would reduce
emotional reactivity relative to training in DR mode. Nonetheless,
as noted earlier, the A-DR–mode manipulation may be more
potent for less-dysphoric populations, whereas the DR-mode ma-
nipulation may be more potent for more-dysphoric populations. A
low-dysphoria sample, such as in the current studies, may find it to
harder to engage in a manipulation training DR mode, whereas
individuals more prone to depression may be more responsive to
the DR-mode training. For these reasons, it is important that the
generalizability of these findings to individuals with clinical de-
pression is empirically tested.
A fourth limitation concerns the selection of the training mate-
rial used. We assumed that training would have the greatest like-
lihood of influencing emotional reactivity if the training itself was
focused on emotional scenarios that were relevant to the subse-
quent negative stressor. However, we also chose to use a balance
of positive scenarios and negative scenarios in order to minimize
any overall mood-induction effects of the training itself. One
potential limitation of this design is that the use of positive training
materials may reduce the ecological validity of the training task
because naturally occurring depressive rumination is focused pre-
dominantly on negative events. Further, the inclusion of positive
scenarios in the training materials may dilute the effects of the
training on subsequent emotional reactivity, although this has the
advantage of making the current studies a more conservative test
of our hypothesis. One might argue that training would have
stronger effects on emotional reactivity if the training items were
exclusively negative scenarios and weaker effects if the training
items were exclusively neutral or positive. Nonetheless, it remains
an empirical question as to whether similar effects would be found
if the training materials were exclusively negative, positive or
neutral.
A fifth limitation concerns the possibility that the simple mea-
sure of self-focus may conflate distinct forms of self-focus. Recent
theories emphasize a distinction between ruminative self-focus
motivated by threat versus reflective self-focus motivated by cu-
riosity (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). It may be that the distinct
processing modes would have differential effects on these distinct
forms of self-focus that the current experiments cannot determine.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that it is possible to
manipulate individuals’ subsequent emotional reactivity by train-
ing them to adopt either a mind-set characteristic of the phenom-
enology of depressive rumination or a mind-set antithetical to that
observed in depressive rumination. These findings suggest that it is
not just cognitive biases toward or away from negative information
that can cause variations in emotional reactivity, but also that the
mode in which people process emotional information causally
influences subsequent emotional reactivity.
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